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We urge the Congress to insure that those accused of even the most terrible
crimes against humanity be accorded fundamental due process because our commit·
ment to accord everyone the protection of the rule of law is what in the end distinguishes us from the telTorist who simply kill in the name of some greater good.
CONCLUSION

In the darkest days of the Cold War we found ways to reconcile both the requirements for security and those d accountability and due process, by taking seriously
both interests. No less is requ.;red if in the long run, we expect to be successful in
the fight against terrorists, who care nothing for either human liberty or individual
rights.
We need to look seriously at how security interests can be served while respecting
civil liberties and human rig~. It is time to give serious consideration to whether
promoting democracy, justice, and human rights will, in the long run, prove to be
a powerful weapon against terrorism along with law enforcement and military
strength. CUlTent administration policies assign no weight to respecting civil lib·
erties as useful in the fight against terrorism. Only when that is done, wilJ we truly
be effective in what has been acknowledged to be a long and difficult struggle.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you.
I would also note for each of the witnesses, obviously we are, because of the time, being a little bit tighter on the control of the
time than normal. But, certainly, you will be getting back transcripts of this and anything you want to add to the transcript, any
one of you, of your own testimony, of course, feel free to do that
and to make it part of the permanent record. This is going to be
a series' of hearings that are -going to go on for some time and if
individual witpesses wish to add to their testimony, they will be
able to.
Professor, thank you very much for being here, and please go
ahead.
.
STATEMENT OF NEAL KATYAL, VISITING PROFESSOR, YALE
LAW SCHOOL, PROFESSOR OF LAW, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. KATYAL. Mr. Chairman, Senator Hatch and members of the
Committee, in my judgment the President's order for military tribunals and the Attorney Generars attorney-client regulation both
contain serious constitutional flaws. Much attention has been focused" on ""hether these decisions violate notions of fair play, but
there is a troubling and different issue. These decisions aggressively usurp the role of Congress.
Of course, all Presidents are tempted to'go it alone. President
Truman seized the steel mills and President Roosevelt tried to pack
the courts. Yet, our Constitution's structure, as Senator Specter reminds us in his eloquent editorial in today's New York Times, mandates that fundamental choices such as these be made not by one
person but by the branches of Government working together. Ignormg this tradition charts a dan¥erous course for the future and may
jeopardize the criminal convicttons of the terrorists today.
Throughout history, there have been times when this country has
had to dispense with civil trials and other protections. Yet, those
circumstances have been rare, carefully circumscribed, and never
unilaterally defined by a single person.
A tremendous danger exists if the power is left in one individual
to put aside our constitutional traditions when our nation is at crisis. The safeguard against the potential for this abqse has always
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been Congress' invQ}yrurumtjn a deep constitutional sense. The default should be faith in our traditions and faith in our procedures.
The attorney-client regulation was announced with no legislative
consideration whatsoever. It comes close to infringing both Fourth
Amendment rights of privacy and the ~ixth Amendment rights to
counsel. Those subject to the rule aren't even charged with a crime,
for the regulation explicitly contemplates use against "material witnesses."
- The Government is currently detaining over 1,100 individuals.
On what basis we don't even know. Yet, now it asserts the unilateral power to abrogate the freedom between attorney and client, a
freedom described by our Supreme Court as the oldest privilege at
common law. _~ -A client might want to talk to his lawyer about the most private -matters imaginable-a divorce created, in part, by the Government's attention, for example-and can't do privately. This is a dramatic and un~recedented aggrandizement of power.
The decree s constitutionality is particularly in doubt when a series of less restrictive alternatives exist, and this is particularly
true if, as the Justice Department says today, the regulation only
applies to 16 individuals, a fact that will actually backfire on the
administration's legal case in the future. Such an intrusion into
private affairs can only be justified by compelling circumstances,
and these circumstances should be announced by this body, by the
Congress, in the form of law, not executive decree;
The Fourth Amendment focuses 011 reasonableness, and one way
in which courts assess reasonableness is by looking to Congress.
When the courts were in conflict over whether the courts could conduct certain intelligence surveillance, this body and the President
compromised in the FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act. This Committee stated at that time the goal of the legislation
was to end ~he President and the Attorney General's practice of
disregarding the Bill of Ri~hts "on their own unilateral determination that national security Justifies it."
Moving to the issue of military tribunals, the sweep of the order
goes far beyond anything that Congress has authorized, for it explicitly extends the tribunal's reach to conduct unrelated to the
September 11 attacks.
For exampJ~, i( a ~asque separatist tomorrow kills an American
citizen in Madrid, or - a member of the Irish Liberation Army
threatens the American embassy tn London, the military tribunal
has Jurisdiction over both claims. So, too, the tribunal may have jurisdiction over a permanent green card-holder in Montana who
tries to hack into the Commerce Department.
There is no conceivable legislative authorization for these types
of trials, trials that may take place under conditions of absolute secrecy. The administration thus sets an extremely dangerous precedent. A future President might unilaterally declare that America is
in a war on drugs and decide to place certain narcotics traffickers
in secret military trials.
Imagine atlother President who hates guns. That President
mi~ht say the threat posed by guns is 80 significant that monitonng of private conversations between attorneys and gun dealers,
and monitoring of conversations between attorneys and gun pur-
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chasers, is required, pointing to the precedent set by this administration.
Now, these examples might seem unbelievable to you, but they
are much smaller steps than the one the administration is now taking when one compares what previous administrations have done
to what the present administration claims it can do today.
It is therefore my hope that this Committee will use its authority
to impress ufon the administration that its decrees have serious
constitutiona problems and secure a promise from the President
not to use military courts, particularly in America, and not to use
attorney-client monitoring until this body so authorizes them. This
Committee could then immediately commence hearings to determine whether those policies are appropriate and, if so, how ther.
should be circumscribed, just as it did with the USA PATRIOT bil .
In conclusion, like all Americans, I believe the administration is
trying, in goo(l faith, to do the best it can, but that is part of the
point. Our constitutional design can't leave these choices to one
man, however well-intentioned -and wise he may be. We don't live
in a monarchy.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Katyal follows:]
STATEMENT OF NEAL KATYAL, PROFESSOR OF LAw, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Chairman Leahy and members of the Committee, for inviting me here
today to discuss the topic of preserving our freedoms while defending against terrorism. In particular, I _will focus my remarks on the constitutionality of the President's recent Order regarding military tribunals and Attorney General Order No.
2529-2001, which permits the Justice Department to monitor communications between attorneys and their clients under certain circumstances. In my judgment,
both of these policies usurp the power of Congress. Our Constitution's framework,
from top to bottoml evinces a strong structural preference that deCisions of this magnitude not be maae by one person. Our Founders understood the temptation that
a single ~rson would have when given unbridled power, an understandmg substantiated thiS century when President Franklin Roosevelt tried to pack the courts and
President Truman attempted to seize the steel mills. The current course of conduct
is an unprecedented aggrandizement of power, one that not only threatens the constitutionill prerogatives of this body but also risks jeopardizing the criminal"convictions of those responsible for the September 11 attacks.
At the outset, let me be clear about what I am not saying: I ca"nnot say that either
of these policies, if crafted correctly and appropriately circumscribed, would be unconstitutional. The policies come close to the constitutional line, but national security in some instances may compel the country 00_ create military tribunals or to
monitor conversations between attorneys and chents. The problem today is that the
Executive Branch has not made this case, either to this bOdy or to the country. AIJ
bystanders, it is impossible to know whether military necessity reguires the measures taken by the Aaministration. Many terrible things have been done in the name
of national security-but many terrible disasters have also been averted through
concerted efforts by our law enforcement agents and intelligence community. The
tough issue is how to strike a balance.
Our Constitution commits this tough issue not to a single person, but to our
branches of government working to~ether. Throu~hout histoTYh there have been
times when this country has had to dispense with Clvil trials, Wit other protections
in the Bill of Ri~hts, and with the rules of evidence. Those circumstances have been
rare, carefully Clrcumscribed, and never unilaterally defined by a single person. A
tremendous danger exists if the power is left in one individual to 'put aside our constitutional traditions and protections when he decides the nation IS in a time of crisis. 1'he safeguard against the potential for the abuse of military trials has alwaY8
been Congress' involvement, in a deep constitutional sense.
As I will explain, the sweep of the MilitalY Order goes far beyond anything Congress hal authorized, for it explicitly extends the tribunals' reach to conduct unrelated to the September 11 attacks. For example, if a Basque Separatist tomorrow
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kills an American citizen in Madrid or a member of the Irish Liberation Army
threatens the American embassy' in L;ndon, the military tribunal has jurisdiction
over both persons. So too, the tnbunal has jUrisdiction over a permanent green card
holder in Montana who tries to hack into the Commerce Department, thus disregarding years of legislative consideration over the computer crimes statutes.
There is no conceivable IltatUtory warrant for such trial8, trilils that may take rlace
under conditions of absolute secrecy. At most, the reach of a military tribuna can
reach a theater of war, not Spain, Great Britain, Montana, or the range of other
locations not currently in arme(l conflict.
The Military Order thus sets an extremely dangerous precedent. A future President might unilaterally declare that America is in a "War on Drugs," and decide
to place certain narcotics traffickers in military trials. A President might say that
some proopective threat is "the moral equivalent of war" and set up military tribunals to counter that threat as well. Some of these decisions might be entirely justified given the particular facts at issue. But they are the sorts of decisions that cannot be made by one man alone. These hl'Potheticals are much smaller steps than the
one the Administration is now taking. The Administration's Military Order is such
a dramatic extension of the. concept of military tribunals, when compared to the
predece880rs in American history, that these other steps appear not only plausible,
but even likely, down the road.
Because the Military Order strays well beyond what is constitutionally permissible, this Committee should inform the White House of the serious constitutional
concerns involved in the President's unilateral Military Order. It should ask the
President not to use the tribunals until necessary authorizing legislation is passed,
and should immediately commence hearings to determine whether military tribunals are appropriate and, if so, how they should be constituted. Without legIslation,
however, the use of a military tribunals raises serious constitutional concerns, dif·
ficulties that may even lead to reversal of criminal convictions.
THE MILITARY ORDER

The jurisdiction of the military tribunal reaches any suspected terrorist or person
helping such an individual, whether or not the suspect is connected to AI Qaeda and
the September 11 attacks. That individual can be a permanent resident alien, thus
potentIally applying to millions of American residents. The order explicitly permits
tribunals to be set up not simply in Mghanistan, but rather they will "sit at any
time and any place"-including the continental United States. §4(c)(I); see also
§ 3(a), § 7(d). Tlie order authorizes punishment up to "life imprisonment or death."
§4(a). Both conviction and sentencing (including for death) is determined when twothirds of a military tribunal agtE\e. At the trial, federal rules of evidence will not
apply, instead evidence can be admitted if it has "probative value to a reasonable
person." § 4(c)(3). Grand jury indictment and presentment will be eliminated, so too
will a jury trial. The members of the military tribunal will lack the insulation of
Article III judges, being dependent on their superiors for promotions. The Order also
strongly suggests that classified information will not be made available to defendants even though such material may be used to convict them or may be significantlyexculpatory. See §4(c)(4); § 7(a)(1). The Order further claims that defendants
"shall not be _privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding. . .in any
court of the United States, or anr. Sta~ thereof." §7(b). And most damaging: the
tribunals may operate in secret, WIthout any publicity to check their abuses.
In short, these military tribunals will lack most of the safeguards Americans take
for granted, safeguards that the American government routinely insists upon for its
citizens either here or when they are accused of a crime ·overseas. The Constitution
generaliy requires: 1) a trial by Jury, U.S. Const., Art III, § 2 ("The Trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury"); 2) that the jury trial
be a public one, U.S. Const., Am. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the ri~ht to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jurr.. . ."); 3) those accused the nl{ht to confront witnesses and subpoena (lefense WItnesses, [d. ("to be
confronted WIth the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor"); 4) proof beyond a "reasonable doubt" for criminal convictions in general, and detailed procedural protections to insure accuracy before the
death penalty is imposed; and 5) indictment by a grand jury, U.S. Const., Am. V
("No person shall be held to 8nllwer for a capititJ, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of 8 Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service ;n time of War or public danget"). These constitutional guarantees may be found inapplicable at times,l
I
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339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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but much caution is warranted before makinlf such a finding. Such findings should
be made carefully, and not by a single person m a secretive way.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION EVINCES A STRONG PREFERENCE AGAINST
THIS UNILATERAL MILITARY ORDER

The American colonists, who wrote our Declaration of Independence _penned
among their charges against the King, first, "He has affected to render the Military
independent of and superior to the Civil Power",2 second, "For depriving us, in many
Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury,":! and third, that George III had "made
Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of their Offices, and the Amount
and Payment of their Salaries." It was no accident that the Framers established
three branches of government in the wake of George Ill's reign. A Congress to write
the laws, an Executive Branch to enforce them, and a Judicial Branch to interpret
them. Consider how markedly the Order establishing the military tribunal departs
from this constitutional scheme. This Congress has not been asked to create a military tribunal. The Order attempts to strip the Judicial Branch of much or all of its
authorit~ to review the decisions taken by the Executive Branch. And the judges
are not~udges" as civilians know them, but rather officials who are part of the Executive Branch. The Executive Branch is acting as lawmaker, law enforcer, and
judge. The premise of the Military Order is to bar involvement by any other branch,
at every pomt. This is exactly what James Madison warned against when he wrote
''The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same
hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." Federalist No. 47
(Cooke ed., 1961), at 324.
The issues raised by the Military Order concern not only today, but tomorrow.
You can already hear how our treatment of the Nazi sabOteurs in 1942 has become
the guidepost for our treatment of individuals today. What will the present course
of conduct mean for situations down the road? Once the President's power to set
up militarr tribunals is untethered to the locality of war or explicit Congressional
authorization, and given to the President by dint of the office he holds, there is
nothing to stop future Presidents from using these tribunals in all sorts of ways.
In this respect, it is important to underscore that the precedent the Bush administration seeks to revitahze, the Nazi saboteur case of Ex Parte quirin, 317 U.S. 1.
20, 37-38 (1942), explicitly goes so far as to permit miJitary tnbunals to be used
against American citizens. We must be extraordinarily careful when revitalizing an
old and troubling court decision, for doing so win set new precedent for future Presidents that can come back to haunt citizens and aliens alike. Our Constitution limits
the power of one person to set this sort of destructive precedent. If the exigencies
of ttie situation demand it, the Congress can of course authorize military tribunals
or attorney/client monitoring, just as it expanded law-enforcement powers in the
. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
In past circumstances military tribunals have been set up only when Congress
had declared war or had authnrized such tribunals. It is often asked what purpose
the Declaration of War Clause in the Constitution serves. We know it is not about
initiation of troops on foreign soil, Presidents have done that for time immemorial
without such a declaration by Congress. But one thing, among others, a declaration
of war offers is to establish the parameters for Presidential action. By declaring war,
the Congress is stating that the President should receive additional powers in times
of military necessity. A declaration of war serves to confine the Clrcumstances in
which a military tribunal can be used, and it also serves to limit the tribunal's jurisdiction to a finite period of time. As Justice Jackson put it, .
Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that a declaration of a war is
entrusted only to Con~ss. Of course, a state of war may in fact exist without a fonnal declaratIon. But no doctrine that the Court could promulgate
would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a President whose
conduct of foreign affairs is 80 largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the coun2 E.g., Laird v. Tatum/ 408 U.S. I, 19(1972) (Douglas, J:". dill8enting) (finding that this clause
restricts the power of lne military); Reid v. Covert, 364 u.S. 1, 29 (19571; BissoMt/e v. Haig
776 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8 th eir. 1985).
3See, e.g., Neckr v. United States, 527 U.S. I, 31 (1999) (Scajia, J., concurring in part and
diuenting in part) (stating that this clause restrict. the ability of the government to hmit jury
trials); Parkland HOllkry Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 341 n.3 (1979) (Rehnquilt. J., diseenting);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152(968); United State" ex reI. Toth v. Quarle•• 350 U;S.
11. 16 n.9 (1966>.
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try by his own commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign
venture. . . .
Youngstown v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (Jackson, J., concurring).4 Just as this
body feared that the wide-ranging law enforcement powers authorized in the USA
PATRIOT Act might be in existence for too long a time and therefore imposed a sun·
set clause, see § 224, 80 too a declaration of war restricts the duration and scope
o(military jurisdiction. No such confinement exists in the Military Order.
A declaration of war, however, is not the only way for this body to provide its assent to military tribunals. Congress cau, through ordinary legislatIon, authorize
them, and, if appropriate, limit them. If it were to do so, the constitutional footing
of the tribunals would be far stronger. The current unilateral action taken by the
Bush Administration threatens to result in the release of those subject to the Mili·
tary Order. Without sufficient approval by Congress, the Executive Branch has set
up an easy constitutional challenge to the existence of the tribunals. There is no
good reason why criminal convictions should be jeopardized in this way. The Executive should make his case to Congress, and let Congress decide how it wants to proceed. The failure to do so may be read by courts to imply that reasons other than
national security undergird his decision. Should this body authorize such trials, by
contrast, it would be read by courts as extremely important indicia about the seriousness of the threat. Ii
THE NAZI SABOTEUR CASl':,

Ex Parte Quirin, Is

NOT APPROPRIATE PRECEDENT

The Administration has repeatedly pointed to the fact that President Roosevelt
issued an order permitting the military trial of eight Nazi saboteurs. The Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the military tribunals in the Quirin case, but
did so in a way that militates against, not for, the constitutionality of the present
Military Order.
In Quirin, fonnal war had been declared by the Congress. The SUp'reme Court
opinion is rife with references to this legislative authorization for the tnbunals. E.g.,
317 U.S., at 26 ("The Constitution thus invests the President, as Commander in
Chief, with the power to wage war which Congress has declared") (emphasis added);
Id., at 25 ("But the detention and trial of petitioners-ordered by the President in
the declared exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief of the Army in time of
war and of grave public danger-are not to be set aside by the courts without the
clear conviction that they are in conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress
constitutionally enacted") (emphasis added); Id.rat 35 (stating that "those who during time of war pass surreptiously from enemy territory into are own. . .have the
status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission") (emphasis added); [d., at 42 ("it has never been sus-gested in the very extensive literature
of the subject that an alien spy, in time or war, could not be tried by a military
tribunal without a Jury"} (emphasis added). What's more, the Court, found that two
portions of legislation, the Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. § 1471-1593, and the Espionage Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. §38, had recognized the validity of military tribUnals
in times "of war." Quirin, 3l..7 U.S. at 26-27. But applicable legislation here is lack~See also Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579,612 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurrin~) ("In this case,
reliance on the powers that flow from declared war has been commendably disclaimed by the
Solicitor General").
" Naturally, if the subject of the tribunal is a major figure like Osama Bin Laden, courts may
be unlikely to void a conviction on any ground. But these tribunals aren't bein~ consider for
Bin Laden alone, but also for the more minor players. In those cases, the risk is Significant that
a court will overturn a conviction because these tribunals are not constitutionally authorized.
Should the courts instead uphold such unconstitutionally created tribunals, Americans will then
be left with a dangerous precc<ient that can be used to undennine constitutional guarantees in
other situations. Consider Justice Jackson's thoughu in his Korematsu dissent:
(AJ judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is far more
subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself. A military order, hO\~ever uncon·
stitutional, is not apt to last longer than the-military emergency . . . . But one a judicial opinion
rationalizes such an order to show that it confonns to the Constitution. . . the Court for all time
has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting
American citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon. . . .A military com·
mander may overstep the bounds of constitutionalitr, and it is an incident. But if we review
and approve, that p888ing incident becomea the doctnne of the Constitution. There it hu a gen·
erative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its own image. Korematsu v. Uniw1
Stales, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944) (Jackson, J. t di8tlentin~). Precisely because court8 are not
equipped to 888C88 the national security implications of vanoWi measures, this body hu a vital
role to play in balancing the national security against our constitutional tradition of individual
liberties.

99
ing. 6 Indeed, the Quirin Court explicitly reserved the question of the President's
unilateral power: "It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what extent the President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military commissions without the support of Congressional legislation. For here Congress has authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions." Id., at 29. 7
AB I will discuss in detail in a moment, it cannot be maintained that this body
has acted comparably with respect to the September 11 attacks. Congress has not
declared war. Congress has not stated that the laws of war are applicable to terrorists or that military tribunals are appropriate. It is of course within Congress' prerogative to make these statements, and to have them acted upon by the Executive
Branch in its discretion, and later interpreted by the courts. But without a clear
statement by Congress, it is a very dangerous precedent to permit the Executive
Branch to unilaterally make such a decision. The Quirin case does not go nearly
as far as supporters of the tribunal:} wish, indeed, it confirms the simple constitutional fact that Congress, not the President. is responsible for setting up these tribunals.
Furthermore, the Quirin case took place at a time when Americans were in a full·
scale world war, where the exigencies of the situation demanded a qukk result. See
QUirin, 317 U.S., at 39 (stating that military tribunals "in the natural course of
events are usually called upon to function under conditions precluding resort to such
procedures (as trial by jury}"). Quirin, just as the Revolutionary War, the War of
1812. and the Civil War. were all circumstances ill which there was total war in
the homeland, with large numbers of enemy troops as occupants. There was a real
danger in each that America might lose. The Administration today, by contrast, has
not made the case, or even attempted to do so. that the circumstances are comparable. This body might of course so find, and that would go a fong way towards
removing the constitutional objections. Proportionality is an endemic feature of our
government. and deprivations of individual rights that are proportional to the threat
presented will often survive constitutional scrutiny. In this case. however, military
tribunals cannot be said to be an automatically proportionate response to a threat.
If the Administration believes that they are. it should, as other Presidents have
done, ask the Congress for greater authority due to the nature of the threat, not
decide as much on its own.
President Roosevelt's order also strictly circumscribed the military tribunal's jurisdiction to cases involving "sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations
of the law of war." Roosevelt Proclamation, 56 Stat. 1964. 1964 (July 2, 1942);
Quirin, 317: U.S. at 30 (finding that prosecution did not violate prohibition on federal common law of crime because Congress explicitly incorporated the law of war
into the jurisdiction for military tribunals). The recent Military Order, by contrast.
brings millions of green-card holders and others into its jurisdiction. The Military
Order extends jurisdiction to "the laws of war and other applicable laws." § l(e) (emphasis added); see also § 4(a) (individuals win be "tried by military commission for
any and all offenses triable by militan commissions") (emphasis added).
These distinctions are alrmade against the backdrop of a case that said that its
holding was an extremely limited one. The Court explicitly said that it had "no occasion now to define with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction
of military tribunals," and that "[wJe hold only that those partiC\llar acts constitute -.
an offense against the law of war which the Constitution authofizes to be tried by
SThe Articles of War appeared at 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471...,1593 (1940) but was later replaced by
the Unifonn Cod.. of Military Justice. 10 U.S.C. §§801 et seq., which preserves the recognition
of the military commissions 88 having concurrent jurisdiction with the courts-martial when authorized by statute or when trying thoee who violate the law of war. 10 U.S.C. §821. Congre88's
authority here arises out of Article I. § 8, cJ. 10 of the United States Constitution which confers
I"Ower upon the Congress to "define and punish ...Offenses against the Law of Nationll . . ."
The common law of war is a subset of the law of nations. See In re Yamas.iita, 327 U.S. 1. 7
(1946).
71t is notable that the some of the main proponents of military tribunals for terrorists have
noted that affinnative Congressional authorization ill necessary. See Spencer J. Crana & Neal
A. Richardson, Justice for War Criminals of Invisible Armies: A New Legal and Military Ap.
proach to Terrornm. 21 Ok. City. L. Rev. 349, 398-99 (1996) (etating that the teneion between
Quirin and Milligan "can be resolved 111m ply by Congress declaring terrorism to be a form of
unlawful belUgerency, from which ordinary law no longer securee either public safety or private
rightl, and further declaring terroristl to be enemy anned forces"); id., at 377 (dacu.uing what
"Congreeeional authorization for the use of military means againat terrorism" should provide in
order to authorize the Preaident "to establillh a military commiNion").
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military commission." Quirin, 317 U.S., at 45-46. Indeed, QUirin recognized that the
use of tribunals may be conditioned by the Sixth Amendment. 8
The Nazi saboteur case, as Justice Frankfurter later called it, is not "a happy
precedent." Danielsky, The Saboteurs' Case.L..1 J. S. Ct. Hist. 61, 80 (1996) (quoting
memorandum from Justice FrankfiJrter).9 Tne real reason President Roosevelt authorized these military tribunals was to keep evidence of the FBI's bungling of the
case secret. One of the saboteurs, George Dasch, had ,nformed the FBI of the plot
uJ>On his arrival in the United States, and the FBI di$'missed his sto~ as a "crank
call." Later, the saboteur went to Washingto~ checked into the Mayflower Hotel,
and told his story in person to the FBI. The I'BI still did not believe him. It was
only after he pulled $80,000 in cash out of hill briefcase that the government took
him seriously. With Dasch's help, the government arrested the other saboteurs. Yet
the government put out press releases suggesting that it was the FBI's diligence
that resulted in the arrests. to "This was the beginning of government control on in- formation about the Saboteurs' Case and the government's successful use of the case
fo~ropaganda llurposes." Danielsky, supra, at 65.
Finally, even If one is left believing the Quirin case provides some judicial precedent in favor of the present military order, this Body IS by no means compelled to
believe that this judicial decision is the last word on what is constitutional. After
all, two years after Quirin, the same Supreme Court uPlleld the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II in the infamous Korematsu case, 323 U.S. 214
(1944). Korematsu demonstrates that judges will sometimes bend over backwards to
defer to a claim of military necessity. Judges are generalists and not particularly
suited to evaluating claims of military necessity. For that reason, judicial precedents
are not always a helpful guide in detennining the meaning of the Constitution, for
their determmations are made under traditions that sometimes under enforce certain constitutional rights. See Sa~er, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Under enforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978). This body, by contrast,
has the securitr. clearances and the expertise to scrutinize and evaluate claims of
military neceSSIty in light of its commitment to the Constitution, see U.S. Const.,
Art. VI [21. This is particularly the case here, for the Constitution's meaning has
evolved in several ways since 1942, not onlr with respect to equality, but particularly with resjlect to the treatment of crinunal defendants and conceptions of due
process. See Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 Duke L.J. 1335,
1346-59.
In sum, while the natural tendency is to look to the Quirin case, Quirin is only
a narrow (and inapplicable) exception to the general presumption against military
trials in this nation. What's more, Quirin was decided before the due process revolution in the federal courts, which took place only in the 1960s. It is not even clear
that the limited holding in Quirin exists today.
OTHER APPLICABLE PRECEDENT

In circumstances that echo some of todays more far reaching provisions a ~i
tary commi8sio~ tried a group of men for conspiracy against the United States in
8 We may aaeume that' there are acta regarded in other countries, or by 80me writers on inter·
national law, as offenses against the law of war which would not be triable by military tribunal
here, either because they are not recognized by our courts as violations of the law of war or
because they are of that c188B of offenses constitutionally triable only by a jury. It was upon
such grounds that the Court denied the right to proceed by military tribunal in Ex parte MilJlgan supra." Id., at 29
.
9The private papers of the Justices reveal that Chief Justice Stone struggled to find a way
to_ claim that ConlP.'eae had authorized the tribunals, and his all8wer appears dubioua. MStone
answered it uneasily by interpreting a provision in Article of War 15. . . .Thus Congress, he
said, in enacting Article 15, had adopted the law of war as a system of common law for military
commiaeions. To arrive at this interpretation, Stone ifDored the legislative history of Article
15. . .He al80 ignored the petitioners' argument that 1t was settled doctrine that there is no
federal common law of crime. Finally, he ignored the constitutional problems raised by his interpretation." Daniolsky, supra, at 73. See also id., at 76 (quoting Juatice Black's memorandum
on the case, which stated that I "seriously question whether Congress could constitutionally confer jurisdiction to try all such violations before military tribunals. In this cue I want to go not
further than to declare that these particular defendants are subject to the jurisdiction of a mili·
tary tribunal because of the circumstances. . .">.
10 Attome~ General Biddle stated that as a result of the secrecy, "it was generally concluded
that a partIcularly brilliant FBI agent, probably attending the school in sabotage where the
_eight had been trained, had been able to get on the inside. . ."Danielsky, supra, at 66. Biddle
insisted on abeolute secrecy, Secretary of War Stimson later wrote in his diary, because of particular evidence that was likely to come out at a public trial. This evidence mcluded Dasch's
cooperation. the FBI's ignoring of Ouch's phone call, and the delay in reporting discovery of
the saboteur's landing. Id., at 66.
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\ 1864. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120 (1866). Milligan sought a writ of habeas
corpus, arguing that a military court could not impose sentence on civilians who
were not in a theater of war. Several features of the opinion are relevant. The Court
disa~eed with the government's claim that ConstitutIOnal rights did not operate in
wartIme, explaining the reach of the Fourth, Fifth, and SiXth Amendments, and
stating that the founders of the Constitution
foresaw that troublous times would arise, when rules and people would become restive under restraint. . .and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be in peril . . . .The Constitution of the United States is the law
for rulers and people, equally in war and peace, and covers with the shield
of its protection aU classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances."
Milli~an, 71 U.S., at 120. see also William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws But One:
Civil Llbertws in Wartime 137 (1998) ("The Milligan decision is justly celebrated for
its rejection of the government's position that tne Bill of Rights has no application
in wartime. It would have been a sounder decision, and much more widely ap~roved
at the time, had it not gone out of its way to declare that Congress had no authority
to do that which it never tried to do. to)
Milligan went on to hold that when courts are closed due to war, then martial
law may be justified in limited circumstances:
If, in forei~ invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to admInister criminal justice according to law, then, on the theater of active
military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity...as no power
is left but the military.. . .As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration;
for, if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross distortion of power. Martial rule can never exist where courts are open, and in the
~roper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the local·
lty of actual war. Because, during the [Civil War] it could have been enforced in
VirgInia, where the· national authority was overturned and the courts driven out,
it does not follow that it should obtain in Indiana, where that authority was never
disputed, and justice was always administered.
Milligan, 71 U.S., at 127. This part of Millisan was distinguished in Quirin, but
only on the unique facts of the case, for the (/uirin defendants were charged with
violating the Law of War after a declared war and were charged in the locality of
the actual war. Under the still-standing Milligan rule, martial law might have been
appropriate in New York City in the days immediately following the World Trade
Center attacks, when Foley Square was closed and the Southern District of New
York was not operating as usual. Military tribunals could not exist in other states,
howeve!J and would cease in New York after the federal courts became operational.
While Milligan states the general rule, Quirin at most provides an extremely limited exception to it.
The five Justices in Milligan's mlijorit)' went so far as to prevent military tribunals from being used even when explicitly authorized by Congress. Their decision
provoked controversy, leading Chief Justice Chase to author a partial dissent (joined
by three other Justices). Chief Justice Chase believed that the laws of Congress did
not authorize the use of military tribunals, and therefore joined the mlijority opinion
in part. Milligan, 71 U.S., at 136. This opinion is notable because it underscores the
power of Congress to authorize these tribunals:
We think that Congress had power, though not exercised, to authorize the
military commission which was held in Indiana. . . .
Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern armies
but to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to provide by law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to
the prosecution of war with vigor and success. . .. Congress cannot direct
the conduct of campaigns, nor can the President or any commander under
him, without the sanction of Co1ljf1'e8S, institute tribun81s for the trial and
punishment of offenses, either of soldiers or civilians, unless in cases of a
controlling necessity, which justifiea what it compels, or at least insures
acts of indemnity from the justice of the legislature.
We by no means usert that Congress can establish and apply the laws of
war where no war had been declaied or exists.
. . . .it is within the power of Co~ to determine in what states or districts such ~t and Imminent public danger exists 8S juatifies the authorization of mditary tribunals.
Id.\ at 137-40; see aUo [d., at 122 (m~ority op~) ("One· of the plainest conaatutioD8l provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not
\
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ordained and established by Congress, and not composed of judges appointed during
good behavior").ll Under eIther rule in Milligan, the meJonty rule or Chief Justice
Chase's dissent, the present Military Order fails. It lacks basic constitutional protections, and has not been authorized by Congress.
In another World War II case, the Court faced the issue of the Executive's authority to order military tribunals to try violators of the law of war. In In re Yamashita,
327 U.S. 1 (1946), General Yamashita of the Imperial Japanese Army was tried ana
convicted by a militar:y commission ordered under the President's authority.12 The
Court held that the tnal and punishment of enemies who violate the law of war is
"an exercise of the authority sanctioned by Congress, to administer the system of
military justice recognized by the law of war. That sanction is without qualification
as to the exercise of this authority so long as a state of war exists-from its declaration until peace is proclaimed." Id., at 11-12 (emphasis added). 13
The Supreme Court dealt with the use of mihtary commissions again in Madsen
v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (952), where the dependant wife of an American serviceman was convicted by military commission for the murder of her husband. The
Court found it within the President's power to establish a military tribunal but
under certain constraints. Madsen stated that these commissions ''have been constitutionally recognized agencies for meeting many urgent governmental responsibilities related to war." Id. at 346. AB such, the Court recognized that these tribunals
derive their authority from the Congress' power to "declare war." Id. at 346 n.9, and
from the occupation of Gennany and the recent "cessation of hostilities." Id., at
348. 14
Of course, there may be times when Congress cannot declare war, for one reason
or another.l5 But in many of those cases, the Congress can of course specifically authorize a military tribunal as part of a resolution authorizing force or as stand-alone
legislation. If a particular Administration feels that such Congressional activity isnot feasible (due to, for example, an invasion), it bears a burden in justifying a unilateral course of action. But in a case like the one today, where Congress is able
to meet (indeed, has been meeting to respond to several Administration requests),
this justification for unilateralism does not appear tenable.
CONGRESS HAS NOT AUTHORIZED THE MILITARY TRIBUNALS

The present Military Order relies on the Resolution passed by Congress for legal
support. The Resolution states: "That the President is authonzed to use all necessa? and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he detemunes planned, authorized, committed, - or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order
11 More recent military precedent also suggests that the civil war was similar to a declared
war, and that charges could be brought in the locality of war. See Opinion of Patrick T. Henry,
Assistant Secretary, Department of the Army, March 6, 2000, available at http:1 i
www.surratt.orgldOcuments/muddarmr.pdf ("One might content that the facts Ex Parte
Quirinare distinguishable from those 10 the Mudd Case [regarding the Lincoln assassination]
because the assassination of President Lincoln did not occur during a time of formally declared
war. However the state of hostilities we now call the Civil Was was not legally declared at an
end until 1866. At the time of President Lincoln's assassination, Washington D.C. served as the
nation's military head<luarters and was a fortified city. It remained under martial law for the
duration of the Civil War. . .Soldiers, for the most part, conducted civil policin,i in and around
the city. Under these circumstances.! conditions tantamount to a state of war eXIsted at the time
of President Lincoln's assassination ).
12 In this case the President had proclaimed that "enemy belliJIerents who, during timP. of
war, enter the United States, or an] territory or possession thereof, and who violate the law of
war, should be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals." 327 U.S.,
at 10. This Presidential order was specifically predicated on a state of war existing between two
bellwerent powers.
13 Yamashita al80 recognized that the very existence of these commissions grew out of
Congress's War Power and not any Executive authority. [d. at 12-13 (noting "[t]he war power
from which the (military) commiasion derives its existence" and that the military tribunals had
Mbeen authorized by the political branch of the Government").
IlThe Court quotes from Winthrop, Militarr Law and Precedents, 831 (2d eel. 1920), stating
Mit is those provisions of the Constitution whIch empower Congress to 'declare war' and 'raise
armies: and which, in authorizing the initiation of war, authorize the emJ)loyment of all necessary and pro~r agencies for its due prosecution, from which the tribun8.1 derives it original
sanction. Its autl:iority is thus the same as the authority (or the making and waging of war and
for the exercise of military government and martial law." The court thus 8Ubecn'beS to the view
that military commissions derive any authority they have from Congreeaional sanction under
the war powers. They act only pursuant to Congressional delegation of authority.
1& A declaration of war in today'. circumstances may be poeeible. See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635
66& (1863) ("But it is not neceBsary to constitute war, that both parties should be acknowl~
aa independent nations of BOvereign Statal.").
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to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations or persons." Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 § 2(a).
This Resolution is patently quite far from a declaration of war, and is limited in
- many respects. Significantly. the Resolution passed by Congress,
1) relltricts its reach only to "force."
2) appJies only to persons involved in some way in the September 11 attacks, and
3) permits such activity "in order to" avert prospective damage to the
United States.
Now compare the Resolution with the ¥ilitary Order, which,
1) goes well beyond any conceivable ~efinition of "force."
2) does not confine its reach to persons involved in the September 11 attacks. but goes so far as to permit any terrorist unconnected to the attacks
to be tried before a military tribunal.
3) is entirely retrospective. meting out sentences for past acts, and
4) extends its jurisdiction to places that are not localities of armed conflict.
A tougher question -is presented by persons in Afghanistan. for the Use of Force
Resolution when read in conjunction with the Uniform Code of Military Justice
could suggest military jurisdiction for those that are the direct targets of Congress'
Resolution. As I will explain in a moment, this reading is questionable, but the case
ill a closer one. But the Military Order goes much, much farther than thu, and illustrates the precise dangers with unilateral determinations by the Executive. The
Order does not confine its reach to those involved in the September 11 attacks. It
states that individuals subject to the order include anyone whom,
"there is reason to believe. . .
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism. or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on
the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy;
or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described [in the first
two categories abOve].
Military Order, § 2(a) (emphasis added). There is absolutely no constitutional warrant for such a dramatic expansion of the military tribunal's authority to cover indio
viduals completely unconnected to the September 11 attacks, no matter how broadly
the statutes and precedent can be stretched. This is particularly important in light
of the fact that the Congress explicitly rejected proposed White House language that
would have authorized a broader use of force. See Lancaster, Congress Clears Use
of Force, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 2001, at A4. Subsections ii) and iii) of the .Military
Order therefore underscore just how important it is for this body to carefully circumscribe the jurisdiction-and reach of a military tribunal. Without such guidance,
military tribunals can creep far beyond the circumstances of an emergency, sweeping up many unrelated investigations. "Mission creep" can infect not only military
operations that employ force: but also those that involve prosecuto~ and judges.
In the wake of the martial law of the Civil War, Congress passed the Posse Com·
itatus Act to prevent the military from becoming part of civilian affairs. The Act
states, "Whoever, except in cases and under circumfltances expressly -authorized by
the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air
Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than two rears, or both." 18 U.S.C.S. § 1385 (2001).
This Act reflects the underlying presumptIOn against blurring military and civilian
life, unless Congress authorizes otherwise or the Constitution so demands. It is instructive that this fundamental law has itself been modified recently with respect
to the War on Drugs and immigration. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-380 (authorizing Secretary of Defense to furnish equipment and personnel to assist civilian agencies in
enforcing drug and immigration laws, but preventing the military, with the exception of the Coast Guard, from conducting "a search and seizure, an arrest, or other
similar activity"). The Posse Comitatus Act underscores the general presumption
against civilian life becoming subject to militaTY_ law, unless Congress or the Constitution explicitly say otherwise. The recent Military Order undercuts this poet
Civil War tradition, and does 10 unilaterally.
As previously stated, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is still' on the
books. It might be thought that the language in the Uniform Code. which recognizes
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the concurrent jurisdiction of military tribunals, 10 U.S.C. § 821,16 constitutes sufficient congressional authorization of them under the rule laid down in Quirin. I have
alreadl explained why Quirin, and its interpretation of the predecessor statute to
the UCMJ, does not come close to justifying the present Military Order. Not only
the facts and opinion in Quirin, but cases decided under the UCMJ itself suggest
that this body has not authorized the military tribunals envisioned in the recent
Military Order.
In United States v. Auerette/ 19 U.S.C.M.A. 363 (1970), a civilian employee of the
Army was charged with crimmal violations in Vietnam and tried by court-martial
under the UCMJ. The United States Court of Military Agpeals there decided that,
in determining the a~plicability of the UCMJ, "the words in time of war' mean ...a
war formally declareil by Congress." Id., at 365 (emphasis added). Further, the court
believed that "a strict and literal construction of the phrase 'in time of war' should
be applied," Id., in the case of the jurisdiction of military courts. The conclusion in
this case was that the hostilities in Vietnam, although a ml\jor military action, was
not a formal declaration of war for purposes of the military's jurisdiction. 17 The
Court of Military Appeals followed this line of reasoning is zamora v. Woodson, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 403 (1970), where it held again that the term 'in time of war' means
"a war formally declared by Congress," ld. at 404, and that the military effort in
Vietnam could not qualify as such. The question of whether a terrorist can even
qualify as a belligerent or engage the machinery of the "laws of war" is itself not
clear. See Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peace Time Equivalent of War Crimes,
7 ILSA J. Int'l & Compo L. 391,392 (2001) ("The key is the 'armed conflict' threshold. By their terms, these conventions do not apply to 'situations of internal disturbances and tensions such as riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence.' In those
situations, terrorism is not covered by the laws of war, but rather by a dozen antiterrorism conventions"). 18
Finally, the United States Court of Claims faced this issue in Robb V. United
States, 456 F.2d. 768 (Ct. CI. 1972). The Court of Claims held that the decedent's
prior court-martial had not held jurisdiction over him as a civilian employee of the
Armed Forces because "short of a declared war," Id., at 771, the court-martial did
noipossess jurisdiction under the UCMJ.
Thus both civil and military courts have held that the UCMJ's use of the term
"in a time of war" requires an actual, congressionally declared war to provide jurisdiction over civilians for the military courts-martial or tribunals. This strict reading
should also apply to the Court's previous rulings holding the President's power to
convene military tribunals to vest only "in time of war." This strict reading is justified not only because of the precedent established by the Court of Military appeals
but also in light of the tremendous damage to individual rights the Executive and
the military could CTeat:l if military courts could be convened without explicit Congressional authorization
16The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive
military commissions, prflvost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with
respect to offenders or otTenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military
commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals." 10 U.S.C. §821.
J7 In a rather different setting. the military courts have found that a substantive offense,
sleeping at one's J>l!8t. during time of war, was possible during the Korean War. United States
v. Bancroft, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3 (953). The Court pointed to many indicia of a wartime situation,
. includi.ng specilll "national emergency legislation." Id., at 5. See also United States V. J\yres, 4
U.S.C.M.A. 22() (1954) (following BancnJ(t). Averette is not modified by Bancroft or J\yreB as
Averette is the more recent case and was explicitly decided in light of these other case. While
members of our military might be subject to additional punishment balled on statutes that aggravate penalties during wartime, to apply the jurisdiction of the UCMJ to those not ordinl:rily
subject to it requires an affirmative act of Congress. Averette, at 365 ("We emphasize our awareness that the fighting in Vietnam qualifies 88 a war that word is generally used and understood.
By almost any standard of companson-the number of persons involved, the level of casualties,
the ferocity of the combat, the extent of the Buffering, and the impact on our nation-the Vietnamese armed conflict is a ml\ior military action. aut such a recognition should not serve as
a shortcut for a formal declaration of war, at least in the sensitive area of subjecting civilians
to military jurisdiction.")
The Averette ruleing means that when the constitutional rights hB"I in the balance, court8
{should read statutes as narrowly to avoid violating these rights unless congressional intent is
)clear. The term "time of war" ia ambi.iU0u8, and as such, should be read narrowly as requiri"l
a congr6saional declaration of war before conatitutional rights are abrogated In the name of national aecuritr.. Congress must speak clearly if it wishes to constrain, or allow the Executive to
con.train, civil rights through its war powers.
18 Making the law8 of war applicable to terrorists may also raise problems, including poeaibly
providing them with the "comootant's privilege,"under which combatants are immune from proaecution ror common crimes, and priaoner of war status upon detention. Scharf, 8upra, at 39698.
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After all, many would be surprised to learn that the Administration is arguing
that this Body has already ratified military tribunals for terrorists. The dusting off
of an old statute passed for an entirely different purpose and in another era raises
significant constitutional concerns when that statute is used to justify the deprivation of individual rights. The Supreme Court. often speaks in tenns of "clear statement" rules! if the legishlture wants to deprive someone of a constitutional right,
it should say so clearly, otherwise the legislation will be construed to avoid the constitutional difficulty. E.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (958) (holding that
the Secretary of State could not deny passports on the basis of Communist Party
membership without a clear delegation from Confriss, and that this pernlission
could not be "silently granted") (emphasis added).l Without a clear statement by
this Congress about the need for military tribunals, it will be difficult for a civilian
court to assess the exigencies of the situation and to detennine whether the circumstances justify dispensing with jury trials, grand juries, and the rules of evi.
dence on habeas review.
Even if there is some ambiguity in the UCMJ about the meaning of "time of war,"
standard principles of legislative interpretation would counsel reading the statute
to avoid constitutional difficulties, and mean that the President lacks authority.2o
As Justice Jackson put it in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 673 (IP52), in the zone of twilight between the powers of Congress and the President, "any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables. . . ." One of these imperatives is
the preservation of individual rights. In Valentine v. United States ex rei Neidecker,
299 U.S. 5 (1936), the Court considered the Executive's power to extradite under
a treaty where the treaty did not provide for such extradition. Although this case
took place before Youngstown, it is clear that this Executive action would fall into
Jackson's zone of twilight. The Court did not allow the extradition because of the
trampling of individual rights: "the Constitution creates no executive prerogative to
dispose of the liberty of the individual. Proceeding against (an individual) must be
authorized by law. . . .It necessarily follows that as the legal authority does not
exist save as it is given b)' an act of Congress. . .[i]t must be found that [a] statute. . .confers the power. Id. at 9; see generally Silverstein, Imbalance of Powers
115-16 (1997) (statmg the proposition that when it comes to individual liberties, the
III Dames &·Moore v. Regan. 453 U.S. 654 (1981> loosened the definition of "implied Congressional authorization" somewhat but did not find that lack of Congressional voice would constitute implicit authorization. The decision expressly disclaimed any attempt to use its precedent
in other cases: "we attempt to lay down no i\'eneral 'guidelines' covering other situations not Involved here" and attemft to confine the opimon only to the very questions necessary to decision
of the case. Id., at 66 . In Dames. a case in which a constitutional right was probably not at
stake, the Court approved an Executive Order which terminated all litigation between United
States nationals and Iran in return for the establishment of a claims tribunhl to arbitrate the
disputes. The Court did not find explicit authorization by Congress but grounded a finding of
implied authorization in the fact the Congress had passed the International Claiins Settlement
Act of 1949 which approved another executive claims settlement action and provided a procedure to implement future settlement agreements. Also, the legislative history of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act <IEEPA) showed that Congress accepted the authority
of the President to enter into such settlement agreements. Id. In the current case, Congress has
passed no such legislation which recognizes or ratifies the President's authority to convene military tribunals without a declaration of war, and the constitutional rights at stake are significant. As such. implicit approval of Congre88 cannot be found here as it was in Dames & Moore.
:lO A com.,arison between the Military Order and President Truman's seizure of the steel mills
via Executive Order is Instructive. The Supreme Court declared Truman's Executive Order un
constitutional because it "was a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities. . . .In the frame work of our Constitution, the Prssident's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." Youngstown, supra, at 687
(majority cop. per Black. J.). Even though le~slative action might "often be cumbersome, tlmeconsuming. and apparently inefficient." Justice Douglas stated, that was the process our Constitution set up. See id.• at 629; see also id. ("The doctrine of the separation of powers was
adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power...to save the people from autocracy") (quoting Brandeis, J .• Dissentilll/ in Myers
v. Umted States). &e also YoulII/ston. id., at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring) ('Aside from suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus... [the founders made no express provision
for exercise of extraordinary authority because of a crisis. I do not think we rightfully may 80
amend their work, and, if we could, I am not convinced it would be wise to do so. . . .ITlhe
President of the (GermanI Republic, without concurrence of the Reichstag. was empowered temporarily to suspend any or all individual rights if public safety and order were seriously disturbed or endangered. This proved a temptation to every government. whatever its shade of
opinion, and in 13 yeal'8 suspension of rights was invoked on more the 250 occasions. FinalIy,
Hitler r,'l'8uaded President Von Hindenberg to suspend all such rights. and they wtlre never restored. ).
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Court is hesitant to defer to the Executive in the absence of specific Congressional
mandate).21
In the current case, the Executive Order is made applicable even to resident
aliens who are constitutionaJly vested with due process nghts. As such, the Court
should be wary of allowing the. Executive to unilateraJly abrogate these individual
protections. 22
Finally, if the UCM,v were stretched to give the President power to create a tribunal in this instanc.e, it would leave the statute so broad as to risk being an uncon, stitutional delegation of power. Such a statute would leave the President free to define a "time of war," grant him the discretion to set up military tribunals at will,
bestow upon the Executive the power to prosecute whomever he so selects in a military tribunal, Ilnd give him the power to try those cases before military judges that
serve as part of the Executive Branch and perhaps even the ability to dispense with
habeas corpus and review by an Article III court. It would be a great and
unbounded transfer of legislative power to the Executive Branch, a claim that every
defendant before the tribunal would raise repeatedly. See Clinton v. City of New
York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2108-10 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Industrial Union Dep't,
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687(980) (Rehnquist, J. Concurring); American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 545 (1981)
(Rehnquist. J., dissenting); California. Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 91-93
(974) <Brennan, J., dissenting).
There is one other aspect of the Military Order that is constitutionally troubling:
its secrecy.2:1 Government secrecy is a tremendously dangeroushthough important,
power. The Constitution was designed to avoid secrecy when t e criminal process
has been engaged. Our Founders feared secret trials, knowing that the impulse
would be too great for the prosecutor to abuse his powers. See U.S. Const., Am. VI;
cf'l,¥orrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728-29 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
wnen criminal trials take place in open court in front of a jury of one's peers,
a tremendous checking function exists. Yet the Military Order scraps all of this, and
permits trials to be conducted in secret, without the attention of press or peers.
Nothing will check the power of the prosecutor in these trials. Our enemies will call
them "show trials" to cover up for our government's failures, our friends will wonder
<lIThe Pentagon PaperH Case, NU. Times Co. v. Unill~d States, 403 U.S. 713(971), also underscores the con8titutional problems with unilateral executive action. In that case, the Court,
in a per curiam opinion, denied the President an injunctiOlI to block the New York Times and
the Washington Post from publishing certain documents which the Administration claimed
would be damaging to the military effort in Vietnam. Justice Brennan observed that the Executive acted without authorization from Congress. Previously, Congres!, had considered legislation
which would have made such disclosure criminal. Brennan stated that "filf the proposal. .. had
been enacted, the publication of the documents involved here would certainly have been a crime.
Congress refused, however, to make it a crime." Id. at 746. JUlltice Douglas indicated that the
case might have btwn different with specific Congressional authorization, stating "{tlhere
is. . .no statute barring the publication by the press of the material which the Times and the
Post seek to use." Id. at 720. Douglas also conceded that a state of declared war might authorize
such action on the part of the Executive when he state "(t)he war power stems from a declaration war. . . . Nowhere (in the Constitution) are presidential wars authorized. We need not decide therefore what leveling effect the war power of Congress might have." Id. 722. Similarly
here, a declared state of war vests the President with the power to abrogate some Fifth Amendment rights but in the absence of such declaration of war or specific Congressional authorization, the Executive's attempt to remove Fifth Amendment protection!! through the use of military tribunals is constitutionally problematic.
22 Additionally, if one 8ubscribes to Justice Murphy's view that the Fifth Amendment protects
all people accused by the Federal Government and "{nlo exception is made as to those who are
accused of war crimes or as to those who possess the status of any enemy belligerent," then
it would be logical that the Executive not be allowed to unilaterally abrogate individual rights
of even non-resident aliens. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 26 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (stating
that "(t)he immutable rights of the individuals, including those secured by the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, belong not alone to the members of those nations that excel
cn the battlefield or that subscribe to the democratic ideology. They belong to every person in
the world, victor or vanquished, whatever may be his race, color or beliefs. They rise above the
status of belligerency or outlawry. They survive any popular passion of frenzy of the moment. . . .Such is the universal and indestructible nature of the rights which the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment recognizes and protects When life or liberty is threatened by virtue of the authority of the United States.").
:l3There is also a sec<tnd strain of unilateralism in the Military Order, that of unilateralism
in our foreign policy. Spain has already refused to extradite suspects in the September 11 investigation until America promises not to subject them to a military trial. The upshot of the military order may be to weaken not strengthen, our ability to conduct thorough investigations, to
interview material witnesses, and prosecute those responsible. Again, these costs of the tribunals may be worth it, but these are the type8 of determinations that are appropriate for Congressional oversight.
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why American justice cannot. handle those who are obviously culpable. And a dubious precedent will be set that gives the President the power to establish these tribunals in circumstances untethered to formal declarations of war. If the circumstancefl
demand secret trials, this body can so authorize them. Our Constitution and laws
necessarily require many procedures before the cloak of government secrecy can be
worn.
ATTORNEY GENERAL ORDER No. 2529-2001 RAISES SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS AND JEOPARDIZES THE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS OF THOSE RESPONSIRLE FOR
TERRORISM

A similar analysis of executive unilateralism applies to Attorney General Order
No. 2529-2001. This regulation was announced with no legislative consideration
whatsoever. It comes close to infringing both Fourth Amendment right to privacy
and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Those who are the subject of the rule
have not been charged with a crime, for the order permits monitoring of "inmates,"
defined under this rule to include not merely criminal convicts, but anyone "held
as witnesses, detainees or otherwise." The government is currently detaining well
over 1000 individuals, some on immigration violations, some as possible suspects,
and still others who are material witnesses, all of whom are subject to such monitoring. The monitoring may occur, not on a probable cause standard, but whenever
the Justice Department determines that "reasonable suspicion exists to believe that
an inmate may use the communications with attorneys . . . to facilitate acts of terrorism." [d. Moreover, the determination that someone is too threatening to speak
privately with counsel is made not by a judge, but by the executive branch acting
unilaterally, in contradistinction to other legislative procedures such as the Foreign
Intelli~ence Surveillance Act (FISA).
Agam, this dramatic order, if carefully circumscribed, might be justified on national security grounds, but it is the type of action that requires legislation, not a
unilateral decision by the Executive Branch. After all, "the attorney-client privilege
under federal law fis I the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications
known to the-common law." United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989).
My analysis here will not dwell on judicial cases, for a good reason, there are
none. The Government has not issued such a sweeping ruling in its entire history.
All previous precedents pale in comparison to the major change of law issued by the
Attorney General. To be sure, there are indications that both the Fourth Amendment and Sixth Amendment are violated when the government monitors conversations between attorneys and their clients. But my argument is really one based on
common sense: such an intrusion into private affairs can only be justified by compelling circumstances. Standard separation of powers principles suggest that such a
justification be announced by Congress, in the form of law, and enforced at the discretion of the President.
While defenders of the regulation have pointed out that separate teams for "prevention" and "prosecution" will be set up, the result of this form of monitoring is
to chill the relationship between attorner and client. Confidentiality is the essence
of representation in this privileged relatIOnship. As a result of the new regulation,
people will not be able to consult their lawyers without the risk of a government
agent listening to their conversation. The conversation might be about the most private matters imaginable-a divorce created in part by the government's detention,
for example. A long tradition has prevented the government from intruding into conversations between lawyer and chent, for such matters may be deeply private ones,
subject to traditional fourth amendment protection. Arnar & Amar, The New Regulation Allowing Federal Agents to Momtor Attorney-client Conversations: Why it
Threatens Fourth Amendment Values, Find law, Nov. 16, 2001, at http://
writ. news./indlaw.com lamar !200 11116.html.
Without the order, clients might talk to their lawyers about arranging plea bargains and other deals in exchange for information about future plots of terrorism.
In the wake of the Regulation, these conversations may conceivably to dry up, resulting in the ~overnment receiving less, not more, information. Again, the Justice
De~artment might have special reason to discount this risk, and special reason to
beheve that clients are passing messages through their attorneys. But if so, it is up
to them to make that case to this
Aa a!1yone who has worked with mtelligence data knows, there are often mistakes. This is natural given the shadowy world of informants and ,.purchased information, and circumstances in the wake of September 11 may justity holding people
in detention on the basis of such data, despite these mistakes. But to go farther
than this, and to abrogate the historic relationship between attorney and client in
the name of national security, threatens constitutional freedoms, and, indeed, may
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threaten the criminal convictions of these individuals. This is particularly the case
when a series of less restrictive alternatives exist to the regulation. See Amar &
Amar, supra (discussinff "cleared counsel" approach in Classified Information Procedures Act and videotapmg of attorney/client conv\dsations that could become reviewable ex parte by a judge).
Congressional legislation authorizing such searches will undoubtedly put such a
regulation on stronger constitutional footing. The Fourth Amendment focuses on
reasonableness, and one way in which courts assess reasonableness is by looking to
Congress. Because there is a "strong presumption of constitutionality due to an Act
of Congress). especially when it turns on what is 'reasonable,'" United States v. Di
Re, 332 U.I:;. 581, 585 (1948), the Court has in certain circumstances chosen to
"defer to (the) legislative determination" about the safeguards necessary for
searches and seizures under a particular regulatory scheme. Donovan v. Dewey, 452
U.S. 594,603 (1981). see also Amar, Fourth Amendment. First Principles, 107 Harv.
L. Rev. 757, 816 (1994) ("Legislatures are, and should be, obli~ed to fashion rules
delineating the search and seizure authority of government offiCIals. . . .In cases of
borderline reasonableness, the less specifically the legislature has considered and
authorized the practice in question, the less willing judges and juries should be to
uphold the practice."). Without legislative approval, by contrast, courts may well
frown on such an unprecedented intrusion into privacy. See Coplon v. United States,
191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (Sixth Amendment violated by government interception of private telephone consultations between the accused and lawyer); Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 306 (1966) (assuming without deciding that Coplon is
correct).
While some have claimed that United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480 (S.D.
Fla. 1991) justifies the immense monitoring order involved here, a close reading of
Noriega reveals otherwise. It is tellin~ that the main precedent cited by defenders
of the regulation is a district court opmion from a sin~le district in Florida. In the
case, former Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega claImed that the interception of
his phone calls while in prison (but not those with his attorneys) violated his Fourth
Amendment right, and that his Sixth Amendment right was violated when conversations with his attorneys were intercepted. The district court decision dismissed
the latter claim because the government dId not intentionally intercept the attorner/
client phone calls, see 764 F. Supp., at 1489, a claim that th ..~ government can 10
no way make today. The AG Regulation contemplates intentional monitoring of
these conversations. The Fourth Amendment claim Noriega put forth was not at nil
about monitoring of attorney/client conversations)Jd., at 1490, and therefore did not
decide the difficult issue raised by the Attorney ueneral's Regulation. Moreover, the
Noriega monitoring was done under very limited circumstances where probable
cause was almost certainly met and the search was as reasonable as the facts were
unusual. Noriega did not concern a sweeping order such as the one involved today,
which, again, targets even those held as material witnesses.
In this respect, a comparison with FISA is helpful. When the Circuit Courts were
in conflict on the questIOn of whether the President has inherent authority to conduct surveillance without a prior judicial screen, compare Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516
F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (disclaiming executive power) with United States v.
Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974) (upholding it), Congress and the President
compromised in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. The Act rejected
the notion that the executive may conduct surveillance within the U.S. unbridled
by legislation. 24 FISA was re-affirmed and amended just last month with the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act.
The approach taken with the passage of FISA disclaimed any pretense of
unilaterahsm. At that time, the Senate Judiciary Committee declared that the FISA
was a "recognition by both the executive branch and the congress that the statutory
rule of law must prevail in the area of foreign intelligence surveillance."." S. Rep.
No. 95-604, at 7 (1977) (emphasis added). The Senate Intelligence Committee announced that the FISA represented a "legislative judgment that court orders and
other procedural safeguards are necessary to insure that electronic surveillance by
the U.S. government within this country conforms to the fundamental principles of
the Fourth Amendment." S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 13 (1978).
Speaking for the executive Dranch before thIS Committee, Attorney General Bell
himself agreed to this judgment, praising the Act because "'for the first time in our
society the clandestine intelligence activities of our government shall be subject to
the regulation and receive the positive authority of a public law for all to inspect.'"
:USee Pub. L. No. 95-511. 92 Stat. 1783 (codified 88 50 U.S.C. §f 1801-11 (2001)); Americo
R. Cinquegrana. The Walls (and WiTt's) Have Ears: The Background and First Thn Years of the
Foreign Inlelligell~ Act of 1978. 137 U.Pa. L. Rev. 793 (1989).
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[d. at 7 (citation omitted). He praised it because, as he said, '''it strikes the balance,
sacrifices neither our security nor our civil liberties, and assures that the abuses
of the past will remain in the past and that the dedicated and patriotic men and
women who serve this country in intelli8'~nce positions, often under substantial
hardships and even danger will have the aftirmatum of Congress that their activities
are proper and necessary.'" [d. (emphasis added). At{ain today, we find ourselves in
a world where we need recognition both by the PresIdent and by Congress that the
statutory rule of law must prevail in the area of foreign intelligence surveillance.
The world is not so different today that we do not need the "positive authority of
a public law for all to inspect," or that we do not need procedural safeguards to protect against the abuses of the executive branch.
Twenty-four years ago this Committee spoke that it wanted to "curb the practice"
by which the President and the Attorney General may disregard the Bill of Rights
on their "own unilateral determination that national security justifies it." S. Rep.
95-604, at 8-9 (emphasis added). The executive branch at that time agreed, and
since that time the judiciary has protected that deference to legislative judgment.
A similar course of action is appropriate today.
THE POSSIBILITY Ofo' LEGISLATIVE REVERSAL OF EITHER EXECUTIVE DECISION DOES
NOT MAKE THEM CONSTITUTIONAL

The Congress todar retains some formal power over both the Military Order and
the Attorney Genera Regulation and can use legislation to reverse them. But this
possibility does not transform either Executive decision into a constitutional one.
The Executive Branch has acted ultra vires in issuing both of these decisions, and
both lack the appropriate constitutional stature to survive separation of powers
scrutiny. The speculative possibility of a Congressional reversal cannot make an act
of the Executive constitutional. (If President Clinton during a budget deadlock got
frustrawd and decided to proclaim his budget proposal the law of the land, and directed his Secretary of Treasury to beJin disbursements, Congress would of course
have the power to trump his "budget with one of their own: but the existence of
its trumping power wouldn't make the President's initial action constitutional.) Indeed, President Truman's Order to seize the steel mills could have been reversed
by Congress (a possibility explicitly invited by President Truman-in contradistinction to the recent Administration actions-who sent messages to Congress stating
that he would abide by a legislative determination to overrule his Executive Order).
The dissent in Youngstown made much of Truman's overture to Congress, but that
did not stop the Supreme Court from declaring President Truman's action unconstitutional for overstepping his authority.
Furthermore, there may be all sorts of barriers to Congressional reversal: trials
might be underway, in which case a Congressional reversal might create double
jeopardy problems, or the Congress might not want to set up a dangerous confrontation between the branches in a time of national crisis. A Congressional reversal
would require not a simple majority, but a two-thirds one (because a President
would have the power to veto the legislation prof,l:Jsing the reveraa}), therefore such
a reading of the Constitution would work a subtle but dangerous transformation in
power away from the Congress and toward the President. A future President could
then set up military tribunals in a national crisis, declaring, for example, the "War
on Drugs" to require military tribunals for narcotics traffickers, and the Congress
would have to attain a two-thirds majority affirmatively reverse such a determination. The Separation of Powers is designed precisely to guard against such transfers
of constitutional authority. Particularly because our constitutional traditions are
evolving ones, it is dangerous for one person to be given the authority to freeze the
Constitution at a single moment in time. This body is uniquely equipped to assess
the meaning of constitutional guarantees, such as the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
.'\mendments, in light of contemporary circumstances.
CONCLUSION

Given the national importance and fundamental commitment to Constitutional
values, the better course of action is for the President to onl~ act in this area when
his powera are at their highest ebb, namely, when he acts with the approval of the
co-eql'.1l1 logislative branch. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurriD¥)
(when the President acts with explicit authorization of Congress, "his authority 18
at its maximum, for in includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate."). Even though I am a supporter of the unitary executive
theory, which generally endorses a broad view of constitutional powers of the President, the Military Order and AG Regulation go too far.
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The Executive Branch should therefore, at a minimum, decline to enforce either
the Military Order or the Attorney General regulation until this body has expressly
authorized these methods. The Congress should then immediately take up the question of whether these methods are necessary and proper, and give due weight to the
views of the Administration on this point. A united Executive-Legislative determination, just as with FISA, the USA PATRIOT Act, and other ml\ior national-security
deciSIOns, will best safeguard individual liberty for the future and prevent convictions from being overturned in the ongoing terrorism investigations. At the very
minimum, Congress should consider enacting legislation similar to the War Powers
Act and laws governing covert activity, so that the President is required 1) to notifY
some or all members of Congress quiCkly when military tribunals are initiated, and
2) to provide details of the cases to this body so that it may perform its oversight
function.
In conclusion, like most all Americans, I believe the Administration is trying to
make the best calls that it can. But that's part of the point: Our Constitutional design can't leave these choices to one man, however well intentioned and wise he may
be. We do not live in a monarchy. The structure of government commits wide-ranging decisions such as this to the legislative process. To say this is not to be "soft
on terrorism," but actually to be harder on It. We cannot afford to jeopardize our
beliefs, or to risk accusations of subverting our constitutional tradition, simply because one branch thinks it expedient.

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Professor.
Let me ask you, General Barr--I know you have long supported
the idea of military tribunals-when did you first consult with the
administration on the option of military tribunals, this administration?
Mr. BARR. Well, I didn't consult with anybody. I reminded people
of work that had been done previously in the Department on this
topic.
..
Chairman LEAHY. Reminded people just on the street or people
in the administration?
Mr. BARR. Staff people in the administration.
Chairman LEAHY. And when did you do that?
Mr. BARR. After September 11.
Chairman LEAHY. Shortly thereafter?
Mr. BARR. Yes.
Chairman LEAHY. General, I am th!nking back to the time when
you were Attorney General under former President Bush. We went
through Desert Storm and Desert Shield, facing thousands of people that we were in open conflict with.
Let me ask you, did former President Bush ever issue a similar
order for military tribunals durin~ Desert Storm or Desert Shield?
Mr. BARR. No.
\
Chairman LEAHY. What about' after the bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland?
Mr. BARR. No. It was in that context which we explored the possibility because we looked at the Nuremberg model and considered
setting up a joint military tribunal.
Chairman LEAHY. And did you recommend that to the President?
Mr. BARR. No, because my informal contacts with the Scots indicated they were not interested in doing that, primarily because of
the death penalty.
But the Iraqi war is a good example. That was not a declared
war, but I think it would be ridiculous to say that if the RepUblican
Guards had started executing American prisoners or pilots that
had been shot down that we would have been powerless to convene
military courts to try them for those violations of the laws of war.
Our only option would not have been, as some seem to suggest,

